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2The UK political system is deadlocked, unable to make 
a decision between the different Brexit options on 
the table, with a high degree of uncertainty of what 
will happen next. The final outcome is far from clear: 
while many UK politicians reiterate that no deal does 
not command a majority, it remains the most likely 
outcome, as it is the default specified in Article 50, 
whatever Westminster decides. To prevent this  
worst-case scenario, more time is needed to find  
an alternative that can command a majority in 
the House of Commons, while at the same time is 
compatible with the principles of the EU. This will 
require statesmanship on the UK side but it is far from 
certain that someone will step up to the plate. 
BUYING TIME
One idea to gain time, or even to stop the clock, which 
has been discussed in Westminster, is the revocation of 
Article 50, i.e. withdrawing the notice to the EU that the 
UK is leaving the European Union. The UK can do this 
unilaterally, as was decided by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in the Wightman case. But the ECJ made 
it clear that this implies a decision to remain in the EU 
under current membership conditions; it is not a tool 
that can buy additional time. So going down the route 
of revocation requires a House of Commons majority to 
vote for, and publicly state the willingness to, remain in 
the EU. This is hard to sell to the electorate, especially 
to potential Conservative voters, who see their party 
as the one that has to deliver Brexit, and would punish 
what they consider as backsliding. And it is not only 
the Conservatives: many in the opposition support 
Brexit, either because they are convinced Brexiteers or 
because they feel they cannot go against the result of 
the referendum. 
At some point, a decision will have to be 
made – an extension merely postpones 
that moment, it does not remove the need 
for making a difficult choice. 
So what about the extension of Article 50? In contrast  
to revocation, it requires the unanimous approval  
of the EU27 if the UK government asks for it (which it 
currently says it will not). If it is a technical extension  
to implement a joint decision that has already been 
taken, a short extension is virtually certain, as long as 
the length of the extension does not affect the  
European Parliament elections: potentially, if  
the UK is still a member state by July, some legal 
commentators believe that the UK would have to  
elect MEPs for the EP to continue to function legally.  
No one on either side relishes the prospect of having  
an EP election campaign in the UK, and the final 
outcome would remain uncertain until all is ratified, 
even if the UK has agreed on a way forward. A longer 
extension would thus need very compelling reasons, 
such as the need for sufficient time to hold a  
second referendum.
A substantive extension in absence of a material 
decision in the UK opens a very different debate.  
It raises the possibility of the EU27 setting conditions, 
either narrowly in the interest of an individual  
member state (e.g. it might be seen as a lever by  
Spain to demand reassurances on Gibraltar) or more 
broadly to push the UK towards making a decision in 
the Brexit process. But, most likely, a (short) extension 
would be granted in the end as the EU27 are also  
keen to avoid the costs of a chaotic Brexit. But length 
might be a question: If there is no decision on the UK 
side, the EU might only grant a very short extension  
of a few weeks to force a decision, followed by, if  
needed, a longer one for implementation. 
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE
But even if the UK gets an extension, what comes next? 
At some point, a decision will have to be made – an 
extension merely postpones that moment, it does not 
remove the need for making a difficult choice. 
But even if a second referendum becomes 
possible, it is questionable whether it 
would lead to a different outcome in the 
end, given the deep political and societal 
polarisation in the UK. 
 
A second referendum is unlikely, especially when 
the full weight of the opposition is not behind it. 
Jeremy Corbyn appears to be deeply sceptical about 
referenda, potentially as it can be argued that they 
undermine parliamentary democracy. There is not a 
sufficient number of MPs that support it outright, with 
many fearing the electorate’s reaction if there were 
to be another referendum, in addition to significant 
opposition in principle on both sides of the House.  
Even the design of such a vote is far from clear, 
including the format of the vote (one-off, multi-stage, 
multi-option) and what options to put on the ballot 
paper: May’s deal (that has been rejected by Parliament), 
no deal (that the majority does not want), remain (that 
would lead to accusations of re-running the same 
referendum) or an option the EU does not agree with 
(e.g. access to Single Market but without freedom of 
movement)? The EU might well have something to say 
about this – a referendum would need an extension 
beyond June so it is a high hurdle to climb. 
But even if a second referendum becomes possible, it 
is questionable whether it would lead to a different 
outcome in the end, given the deep political and societal 
polarisation in the UK. It is far from certain that such a 
vote would produce a convincing majority for remain, 
potentially producing prolonged uncertainty. The 
3discussed is May’s deal but with a time-limited backstop, 
which the EU27 could never accept.  
ULTRA-SOFT BREXIT?
But even if Westminster would pick an alternative  
that is acceptable to the EU27, there are no obvious 
candidates that could convince the House of Commons. 
Norway and Customs Union combined has repeatedly 
been mentioned as the best ‘soft’ Brexit option. Once 
it is in place, it guarantees an open border, thereby 
removing the need for the backstop. Without a backstop, 
the number of European Research Group/DUP MPs 
May would lose would be limited, and she would 
retain enough moderates/pro-Europeans within the 
Conservative party.  In combination with opposition 
votes, her deal could make it through Parliament, 
especially when standing at the no deal cliff edge.
But not so fast. In the current political system of the UK, 
the opposition doesn’t have a good record of supporting 
a rival government, even in extreme circumstances. 
The priority is to bring down the government and have 
new elections. The thinking is that whatever policy 
changes will need to be made, these can be made by 
the next government, given the UK’s constitution that 
specifies that future parliaments cannot be bound by the 
decisions of the current one. In addition, the Norway+/
Customs Union option does not remove the need for the 
backstop. Realistically, the only place the future model 
for the EU-UK relationship can go to is the political 
declaration, which is only aspirational. The backstop 
would still be needed. Writing Norway+/Customs Union 
into the Withdrawal Agreement would be technically 
tricky, essentially pre-defining the future relationship 
that still needs to be negotiated, and politically 
speaking, both the EU27 and the UK would resist this. 
For the UK, it essentially entails signing a blank cheque: 
in the end, the EU would have to define what the 
model will look like, for example on level playing field 
provisions or the role of ECJ, as it will need to be created 
as a newly designed, separate pillar in the European 
Economic Area. This would be completely unacceptable 
to most UK politicians, essentially relegating the UK to 
the role of blind rule taker. 
A BREXITEER SOLUTION
Alternatively, May could try to rescue her deal  
by trying to please the Brexiteer wing of her party,  
as well as the DUP, by doubling down on the  
UK’s red lines: exit from the Single Market and  
Customs Union, no further rule taking from Brussels. 
This is not enough to see it through now but, as 
Brexit day approaches and economic distress worsens, 
some more moderate Conservative MPs, together 
with a handful of Brexiteers from the opposition and 
abstentions driven by the fear of no deal/recession, 
might just be enough to get a hard Brexit deal  
through when standing in front of the abyss. 
But this is also not feasible because of the backstop. 
The Brexiteers and DUP are adamant that they cannot 
chance of a pro-Brexit backlash could not be excluded 
in the referendum campaign or in the next general 
election, with the claim intensifying that this is  
exactly what the EU/the elites always do. It would 
also raise questions about the future of representative 
democracy if Westminster is unable to decide on  
such an important issue after it was clarified that 
constitutionally Parliament has the final say. In any 
case, it is unlikely that a referendum will find a  
majority in the House of Commons. MPs anticipate the 
likely outcome: the expectation is for remain to win.  
So those who are opposed to remaining are also  
unlikely to support a new referendum.
So what about May’s deal? It has taken quite a  
battering, with a historic defeat in the Commons.  
It is hard to see how it can be resurrected without 
significant changes. The lack of a convincing market 
reaction (probably caused by markets believing 
erroneously that a rejection of May’s deal implies 
remain or a soft Brexit) has resulted in a lack of 
momentum, although some of the real economic  
pain is starting to be felt. But even if she made some 
changes, acknowledging that she needs EU27 support 
for any deviation from the current deal, it is far from 
clear what would convince the House of Commons, in 
whatever direction she turns. 
WESTMINSTER TAKING CONTROL
Exasperated by the limited choices available and 
wanting to avoid a no deal by default, some MPs are now 
proposing that Parliament takes control of the process 
from the government and, for example, pass legislation 
that would imply that the UK would revoke the Article 
50 notification if no alternative is found to command a 
majority. But this effectively implies that the default is 
switched from no deal to remain and it seems unlikely 
that there is a majority for that. 
Exasperated by the limited choices 
available and wanting to avoid a no  
deal by default, some MPs are now 
proposing that Parliament takes control  
of the process from the government and, 
for example, pass legislation that would 
imply that the UK would revoke the  
Article 50 notification if no alternative  
is found to command a majority. 
It also raises a number of additional questions, not least 
the impossibility of the EU negotiating with anyone but 
the UK government. Westminster would have to compel 
the government, which is legally tricky and might lead 
the government to fall, which Conservatives and DUP 
would not support. It is also far from certain that a vote 
in Westminster would produce a more implementable 
outcome. The most common variation currently 
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time-limited or can be cancelled unilaterally by the  
UK. There is no way the EU27 could ever agree to  
this, so this path also does not lead to a majority. 
PLAN C = PLAN B = PLAN A
For now, May seems to have decided that the best  
option left to her is to continue trying to push her  
deal through with some small additions and alterations, 
no matter how fierce the resistance. A combination 
of some procedural concessions on the role of the UK 
parliament, reassurances from the EU on the backstop 
and economic pressure, together with the fear of a 
Corbyn government, might change the arithmetic, 
although there is a long way to go. The hope is that 
if May’s deal is the last alternative standing that 
can prevent Corbyn/new elections and/or a second 
referendum, Conservatives and the DUP might back  
it at the very end. But this is unlikely to work for now. 
As long as MPs still have other options, they will not go 
down this route.
With the endgame nearing and a no-deal scenario 
looming, some of those currently opposed to May’s deal 
might support it. But the danger is that this change of 
mind only comes when it is too late, or that even in such 
extreme circumstances, faced with no deal, not enough 
MPS will choose this way forward. For Jeremy Corbyn 
and large parts of the opposition new elections are the 
priority and they will only support May’s proposals if 
they can bring down the government. Within her party, 
there is also a significant opposition that votes on 
ideological grounds, not only within the ERG, but among 
many opposed to the backstop, including the DUP. 
So May’s deal could be defeated yet again, even when 
standing at the abyss. It doesn’t help that there are a 
number of MPs in her party who positively welcome the 
prospect of no deal. 
For Jeremy Corbyn and large parts of the 
opposition new elections are the priority 
and they will only support May’s proposals 
if they can bring down the government.
 
REVERTING TO NO DEAL
This brings us to the crux of the matter: Theresa May’s 
real red lines. Her biggest priority is not to prevent 
no deal. From her perspective, no deal is better than a 
bad deal, but this has more to do with her own party 
than the negotiations with the EU. What she will seek 
to prevent at all cost is a split within her party and a 
Corbyn majority government. These red lines are shared 
by much if not almost all of her party, and are supported 
by the DUP, which is fiercely anti-Corbyn. 
If she holds fast to her red lines, she might be left with 
no other option than to wait, running down the clock 
and hoping for a last-minute reprieve. But, unless the 
threat of no deal is enough to force a decision, time will 
eventually run out, resulting in no deal by default. 
Alternatively, she ensures the unity of the party, 
overruling the more pro-EU element and retaining the 
support from ERG and, crucially, the mostly Eurosceptic 
Conservative Constituency Associations. She could go 
back to Brussels demanding the removal of the backstop 
and, when rejected, lead the UK into no deal by design, 
blaming the EU and conjuring the Dunkirk spirit. 
A WAY OUT?
Either way, no deal is the most likely outcome. The UK 
political class is faced with a classic prisoners’ dilemma: 
no deal is not the desired outcome of either side but it 
remains the most likely, given the current red lines and 
political priorities of both major parties. Knowing what 
those priorities are, both sides are forced to dig in their 
heels, even though it would be in everyone’s interest to 
compromise, eventually leading to an outcome that both 
(mostly) oppose – no deal, helped by it being the default 
specified in Article 50.  
Either way, no deal is the most likely 
outcome. The UK political class is faced 
with a classic prisoners’ dilemma: no deal 
is not the desired outcome of either side 
but it remains the most likely, given the 
current red lines and political priorities of 
both major parties.
How do you untangle such a prisoners’ dilemma? 
Either side could change their red lines, accepting a 
compromise. Maybe a government of national unity or a 
technocratic government could be a way out, as we have 
seen in the EU and in other countries at the moment 
of acute political crisis. But there is no recent political 
tradition which would make this a feasible option 
within the UK and there is no overarching authority that 
could compel such an outcome, neither in the form of a 
president or a similar figure, nor in constitutional terms.
What remains is statesmanship: sacrificing short-term 
party objectives and one’s own political future for 
the greater good, prioritising country over party and 
power. But how likely is that, given the current political 
leadership?
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